















It has been said that natural theology as a viable concept died on 24th November 1859, the 
date of the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species. Charles Darwin himself studied natural 
theology whilst an undergraduate in the Divinity Faculty in Cambridge. His text was 
Archdeacon William Paley’s Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity collected 
from the Appearances of Nature, first published in London in 1802. In the opening chapter of 
the Evidences Paley asks his reader to consider someone walking in the country who 
happens to strike their foot against a stone. For all that person knows or cares, the stone is 
just a stone, of no consequence and could have been lying there for all eternity. But what if 
the object against which the person’s foot strikes should be a watch? Immediately the 
walker knows from the fact of its design that the watch has been created by a watchmaker. 
By analogy, all the extraordinary adaptations to their environment that we see in animals 
and plants are evidence of a divine designer. Paley’s text is in essence a large and impressive 
collection of descriptions of such adaptations and it is from a consideration of this massed 
evidence that he comes to the certain conclusion that God exists. 
 
Darwin thought that Paley’s Evidences was the only worthwhile textbook he read at 
Cambridge. But of course his account of natural selection immediately made Paley’s 
argument extremely vulnerable. To take a hackneyed example, let us suppose that, due to 
random physical variations within the species (Darwin had no knowledge of the genetic basis 
for these variations), there appears a long-necked giraffe which is able to reach edible leaves 
high up the trees and hence survive better than its shorter necked companions who cannot 
reach those leaves. The longer necked animal is able to survive better because it reaches the 
parts other giraffes cannot reach. Hence it is more likely than other animals to produce off-
spring which perpetuate the adaptation. That is, the process of selection is entirely due to 
the physical nature of the environment and the adaptation requires no intervention by a 
creator God. It is indeed true that the highly sophisticated apparatus of modern evolutionary 
science demonstrates more or less unequivocally that natural selection is a fact, disputed 
nowadays only by people with a fundamentalist axe to grind. 
 
In September 1969, almost exactly 110 years after the publication of The Origin of Species, 
another biologist and enthusiastic Darwinian, Alister Hardy, founded the Religious 
Experience Research Unit in Manchester College, Oxford. Hardy’s vision was of a new kind of 
natural theology that would grow out of the scientific investigation of the spiritual experi-
ence of the human species. Towards the end of his first series of Gifford Lectures1 delivered 
at the University of Aberdeen in 1964, he had stated: 
ALISTER HARDY – 
BIOLOGIST OF THE SPIRIT 
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Those who are concerned lest our civilization will change its nature under the influence of a 
materialistic philosophy might, I believe, do well to consider how they might encourage further 
research into the nature of human personality, in the hope of finding more about the nature of 
God. The great institutes for scientific research having a bearing on man’s bodily comfort – 
upon medical problems direct and indirect, agriculture and fisheries, food, transport and so on 
– are dotted about the country, and are as symbolic of the present age as our glorious 
cathedrals and parish churches are symbolic of our spiritual past. If only one per cent of the 
money spent on the physical and biological sciences could be spent ... it might not be long 
before a new age of faith dawned upon the world. It would, I believe, be a faith in a spiritual 
reality to match that of the middle ages; one based not upon a belief in a miraculous 
interference with the course of nature, but upon a greatly widened scientific outlook. What 
might mankind not do if he used the tools of modern science with the faith and inspiration of 
the cathedral builders? Can the scientific method help to re-establish such a faith? 
 
This vision of Hardy’s was heavily overlaid, if not entirely obscured, for almost all of his 
professional career as one of the world’s leading marine biologists. Indeed, the Alister Hardy 
Society is not the only organisation that currently bears his name. SAHFOS, the Sir Alister 
Hardy Foundation for Ocean Science, has its headquarters in Plymouth, a staff of 20 and an 
annual operating budget last year of two-thirds of a million pounds. It monitors the near-
surface plankton on a network of routes covering the whole of the North Atlantic and North 
Sea on a monthly basis, using the Continuous Plankton Recorder which Hardy invented more 
than 60 years ago. In this essay I want to turn away from that highly salient aspect of 
Alister’s originality to explore the origins and nature of the creative vision that grew out of 




Alister Hardy was born in 1896, the third son of a well-to-do Nottingham architect. In 1911 
he was sent away to public school at Oundle where he immediately specialised in science. 
Very tall and slender, he was excused games because his mother wrote to the school to say 
that he was physically delicate. In any case, he could not participate properly in team sports 
because of an eye defect which caused him to be unable to focus stereoscopically. This 
mishap meant that, whilst other boys were engaged in athletic pursuits, Alister was sent for 
long walks in the Northamptonshire countryside to improve his natural history. It was during 
these walks that he discovered that he was both a naturalist and a nature mystic. I quote 
from his unpublished autobiography, written when he was 88: 
There was a little lane leading off the Northampton road to Park Wood as it was called, and it 
was a haven for the different kinds of brown butterflies. I had never seen so many all together. 
The common Meadow Brown, of course, were everywhere in the fields but here also were the 
Lesser Meadow Brown or Gatekeeper, the Wall Brown and Marbled White, which belongs to 
the same family. As one approached the wood, there was a small covered reservoir with grass 
banks leading over it and this was always the home of many Ringlet butterflies, of which I seem 
to remember there were two forms recognized as a variety. I specially liked walking along the 
banks of various streams watching, as the summer developed, the sequence of wild flowers 
growing along their brims. I was attracted by several streams lying in different directions from 
Oundle. I wandered along their banks, at times almost with a feeling of ecstasy ...  Just occa-
sionally when I was sure no-one could see me, I became so overcome with the glory of the 
natural scene that for a moment or two I fell on my knees in prayer – not prayer asking for 
anything, but thanking God, who felt very real to me, for the glories of his kingdom and for 
allowing me to feel them. It was always by the running waterside that I did this, perhaps in 
front of a great foam of Meadow Sweet or a mass of Purple Loosestrife. 
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Not surprisingly, Alister gravitated towards zoology when he went up to Oxford in 1914 
where Julian Huxley, grandson of T.H. Huxley (‘Darwin’s Bulldog’), was his tutor in Exeter 
College. The strains in a culture are felt consciously or unconsciously by all its members. In 
the case of Alister, the juxtaposition of his intense nature mysticism and his equally intense 
interest in evolutionary theory made this strain particularly overt. Aware that he would be 
leaving Oxford in the same year that he arrived, to fight in the First World War, he made a 
pledge. This was not, he says, a prayer but a promise “to what I called God”, if he were to 
survive the war. He vowed that he would devote his life to attempting to bring about a 
reconciliation between evolutionary theory and the spiritual awareness of humanity that 
would satisfy the intellectual world. 
 
He was 18 years old and that is a very 18-year-oldish thing to say. It is therefore striking that 
he stuck to his promise throughout a very long life. Hardy returned to his degree in Oxford in 
1919 where he fell in love with Sylvia Garstang, a fellow student. His strategy for keeping his 
vow was partly dictated to him by his future father-in-law, Walter Garstang, then Professor 
of Zoology at Leeds. Garstang did not dissuade him from his long-term plan, but advised him 
of the importance of making his name in the field of orthodox science before he began to 
embark on rather more dangerous – or even eccentric – territory. 
 
After graduation he worked as a naturalist in the Fisheries Laboratory in Lowestoft before 
becoming chief zoologist to the Discovery Expedition to the Antarctic in 1924-8. On his 
return he was appointed to a new Chair of Zoology and Oceanography at Hull. From there he 
became Regius Professor of Natural History at the University of Aberdeen (where I first met 
him when I was an undergraduate). In 1946 he was offered the Linacre Chair of Zoology at 
Oxford, which he occupied with great distinction until 1961, being knighted for his services 
to biology. For a further two years he stayed on in Oxford as Professor of Zoological Field 
Studies, and finally was appointed Gifford Lecturer at Aberdeen during the sessions 1963-4 
and 1964-5. As Daniel Dennett says in a footnote in his recent book Darwin’s Dangerous 
Idea, Hardy could hardly have been a more secure member of the scientific establishment. 
 
 
The Gifford Lectures 
The Gifford Lectures finally gave real substance to his youthful promise of 50 years 
previously. In them he wished to make two major points. In the first series, published as The 
Living Stream, he wanted to demonstrate that evolution by means of natural selection is not 
nearly as mechanical a process as is commonly supposed, especially in the higher animals. 
He believed, for example, that the great majority of evolutionary change in mammals and 
birds is initially directed by deliberate alterations in their habits – a process which he calls 
‘behavioural’ or ‘internal’ selection. 
 
As one of his illustrations, he discussed the evidence being gathered during the 1950s of a 
new habit appearing amongst certain birds – the opening of milk bottles, first the cardboard 
tops, then the metal tops – spreading apparently by copying, right through the tit 
populations of Europe. Given the permanence of this change of habit, in due course any 
members of the tit population with a gene complex giving a beak slightly better adapted to 
such activity would have a better chance of survival than those less well equipped. When he 
presented this idea at a meeting of the Linnean Society, some wit reflected on what might 
happen if the metal tops were made thicker, in order to combat the birds. “Would they 
develop beaks shaped like tin openers?” “Exactly right”, said Hardy. Active choice (and, in 
the case of the human species, conscious choice) is, he claimed, in many cases the directing 
agent and precursor of natural selection. Since those days the interaction of social and 
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biological evolution has been dramatically developed, most significantly in William Durham’s 
magisterial book Co-Evolution, first published in 1991. 
 
This point is of considerable importance in combating the view that evolution is an entirely 
mechanical process. It needs a much longer exposition than I have space for, but it leads us 
into Hardy’s other major point, expounded in his second series of Gifford Lectures2 and 
published as The Divine Flame. Hardy agreed with Edmund Burke that we are “religious 
animals”. In his view, as part of the process of consciously investigating their environment, 
the precursors of the human species discovered their relationship to a transcendent 
presence which met them in a different way from the phenomena of their everyday 
experience. How far back in evolutionary terms this consciousness might stretch is not clear, 
but Hardy certainly assumed that it was not confined to the human species. In other words 
he is thinking of a biological predisposition which is not a construction of language, though 
of course from his perspective, discourse about this consciousness is more or less universally 
manifested in the world’s religions, great and small. 
 
The biological reason for the natural selection of this predisposition was, in Hardy’s view, 
because it has survival value to the individual. To me, the most convincing part of the initial 
argument is his reference to social anthropology. Thus he quotes from Émile Durkheim’s 
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life: 
The believer who has communicated with his god is not merely a man who sees new truths of 
which the unbeliever is ignorant; he is a man who is stronger. He feels within him more force, 
either to endure the trials of existence or to conquer them. It is as though he were raised 
above the miseries of the world, because he is raised above his condition as a mere man; he 
believes that he is saved from evil, under whatever form he may conceive this evil. 
And later, 
Our entire study rests upon this postulate that the unanimous sentiment of the believers of all 
times cannot be purely illusory. Together with a recent apologist of the faith [he is referring 
here to William James] we admit that these religious beliefs rest upon a specific experience 
whose demonstrative value is, in one sense, not one bit inferior to that of scientific 
experiments, though different from them. 
Hardy adds his view that an unfortunate ‘materialist spin’ is often put on Durkheim’s 
interpretation of religion: 
Many, who perhaps have not read Durkheim sufficiently carefully, have thought, I believe, that 
his theory of religion is one linking it to a mechanistic interpretation of the evolution of man as 
a social animal. Nothing could be further from the truth, as is clearly shown when he says, “it is 
necessary to avoid seeing in this theory of religion a simple restatement of historical 
materialism: that would be mistaking our thought to an extreme degree”. 
 
Hardy referred to other precursors in the field of psychology, notably the Harvard 
psychologist William James whose masterpiece The Varieties of Religious Experience was 
also based on his Gifford Lectures in the University of Edinburgh in 1901-2. Amongst 
theologians, he was particularly impressed by Rudolf Otto’s work The Idea of the Holy. 
Somewhat more controversially, he called upon evidence from parapsychology and he was 




Now I want to enter more deeply into the nature of Hardy’s originality. Although he is able 
to identify a number of precursors of his ideas, his account of the biological roots of religion 
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is in fact revolutionary in that it offers a testable naturalistic hypothesis about the nature 
and function of human spirituality which is not reductionist in intention. In this respect he is 
clearly at odds with major explanatory conjectures about religion which are currently 
dominant in the social sciences. I am thinking here in the first place of Marxist and Freudian 
hypotheses which, at least in their origins, were attempts to account for the phenomenon of 
religion conceived of as an almost universal human error. In spite of Hardy’s remarks which I 
mentioned earlier, I personally am inclined to include Durkheim as the third member of a 
reductionist triumvirate, perhaps not personally, but through many of his modern followers 
who do seem to interpret him in that way. Thus his statement that religious experience is 
the effervescence or excitement experienced in crowded religious gatherings has frequently 
attracted the prefix ‘nothing but’. 
 
In a moment or two I want to talk about the evidence that has accumulated in support of 
Hardy’s hypothesis, but first I would like to place his originality – and the lack of originality of 
those with whom he disagrees – in a larger historical context. There is a popular assumption 
that the loss of plausibility of religion in many parts of the Western world is the inexorable 
result of an increasing rationality in the way we conduct our affairs. Religion, so the 
argument goes, originally had a genuine social function. In the state of ignorance endured by 
our ancestors it served to reassure and protect them emotionally from the terrors and 
brutalities of existence. But once people became aware of its irrational basis, it ceased to 
serve this purpose and needed to be superseded. On this assumption, it follows that religion 
is at best a psychological defence mechanism, socially constructed out of the fears of 
ignorant people. Hence, like any other human creation, it can be deconstructed by the 
methods of an enlightened social historian. 
 
Yet it is important to remember that reductionist explanations of religion are themselves 
socially constructed and in this respect have no privileged status. Secularism does not stand 
as an objective judge above the operations of history. It is equally as open as religion to the 
attentions of archaeologists of knowledge. The very fact that secularism is primarily a 
European or Western phenomenon alerts us to the probability that this is so. Therefore it is 
perfectly legitimate to ask what were the social factors that went into its construction. This 
enquiry is important because it relates to the creation of a privatized spirituality which has 
increasingly become torn away from its social expression in religion. 
 
 
Explaining Religion in Secular Terms 
In the history of European attempts to understand religion, it is possible to pinpoint a 
sequence of stages in the emergence of an approach which looks at it from the disinterested 
perspective of an outsider. An illustration of this line of reasoning is the sequence traced by 
Samuel Preus in his book Explaining Religion, published in 19873. His intention is to defend 
‘methodological atheism’, and in the process he inadvertently gives a clear account of the 
social and political factors that went into the construction of that stance. 
 
According to Preus, the political context which triggered off this process was the need to 
find a practical solution to the continent-wide chaos and slaughter caused by religious 
conflict following the Reformation. The first attempts were to retrieve a primeval purity of 
religion free of doctrinal dispute and thus capable of leapfrogging over the squabbling errors 
of the time.  
 
Thus, one such response in the 17th Century was the ‘deism’ of Lord Herbert of Cherbury.4 
Herbert argued for a natural religion which could be agreed upon by all people, regardless of 
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the historical differences between the faiths. He believed that everyone has certain innate 
ideas imprinted in their minds by God, including a knowledge that God exists, has a right to 
be worshipped, that virtue is the chief part of the worship of God, that crime is evil and we 
should repent of our sins, and that there will be rewards and punishments after death. He 
did not mean that an infant is born with these beliefs but that a normal person is bound to 
come to them as they reach a mature awareness.5 
 
Whether Lord Herbert was implying some form of religious or spiritual awareness is not 
clear, but he had no wish to deny the possibility. He even said in his autobiography that the 
decision to publish his opinions was based on an insight following a prayer to God for a sign 
of approval, 
I had no sooner spoken these words, but a Loud though yet Gentle noise came from the 
Heavens (for it was like nothing on Earth) which did so comfort and cheer me, that I took my 





Another of Preus’ representative figures is Giambattista Vico7. Vico’s main work The New 
Science, which was published in the first part of the 18th Century, was intended to be 
religiously orthodox and was dedicated to the Pope. Nevertheless, Vico sounds very like 
Herbert when he identifies certain human institutions that he believes are universally found, 
including religion, marriage and the burial of the dead. He differs in that he insists on the 
need for a socio-historical account of the creation of those institutions. He also adds that the 
religions have a secular function since they are necessary for the maintenance of civilisation. 
Preus comments: 
What is really revolutionary about Vico ... is the tendency of his system to explain providence 
away without remainder, except as a category of meaning. There is, however, one final 
‘remnant’, one element of providence in Vico’s scheme for which he does not explicitly offer 
any naturalistic explanation – the idea that there is an innate sense of divinity. This ... is the 
most durable remnant of traditional theology not only in Vico but in the study of religion until 




In Preus’ opinion the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume disposed of this last 
theological remnant, most clearly in The Natural History of Religion, published in 1757.9 
Innateness implies universality and Hume tries to demonstrate, within the limits of his 18th 
Century knowledge, that whilst religion is very widespread it has never been so universal as 
to admit of no exceptions. He adds that there is no uniformity in the ideas which have 
derived from religious belief. In this way the supposed ‘sentiment of religion’ differs from a 
genuine instinct or impression of nature. Examples of these might be ‘self-love’, ‘resentment 
of injuries’ and ‘the passion between the sexes’. These really are universal says Hume and 
rather contentiously claims that they transcend culture because (he believes) they are 
expressed through the same ideas everywhere. Preus’ view is that Hume was pivotal in 
providing for the first time a thoroughgoing naturalistic explanation of religion. Hume finally 
offered a genuine alternative to theology by objectifying religion as a problem to be solved. 
Thus the primary task of the student of religion at last became what it is today, that of 
explaining a natural (and almost universal) human error. 
 
 
The Turn Away from Experience in the 17th Century 
Preus’ argument seems to me to represent what is currently a dominant mode of 
accounting for the phenomenon of religion. It is a line of reasoning that calls for the kinds of 
reductionist explanations that I referred to earlier. At the end of his book Preus makes an 
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appeal to the representatives of theology to co-operate in the investigation of religion as a 
natural phenomenon instead of 
... staking out its own privileged universe of discourse and, so far, failing to show how that 
universe intersects with the one constituted by the rough consensus of the academy at large. 
The issue is not whether ‘transcendence’ refers to something extramentally real, but whether 
the study of religion wishes to enter as a full partner in the study of culture.
10
 
There is here an assumption that Preus’ version of academic consensus is correct and should 
be submitted to gracefully. It is to just such a submissive giving over of the tasks of theology, 
in this case to natural science, that the historian Michael Buckley has recently ascribed the 
rise of European atheism at the beginning of the 17th Century.11 Buckley detects a critical 
shift in the way theologians thought about religion following the Reformation. Instead of 
reflecting directly on their spiritual experience as the major source of their convictions, they 
began to call upon the methods of natural philosophy (that is, physics) to defend their belief 
in God. They felt that the reasonableness of religious belief could best be demonstrated by 
pointing to design in nature. Exemplars of this shift in strategy are the Jesuit Leonard Lessius 
at the University of Louvain and the Franciscan, Marin Mersenne in Paris, both of whom 
were writing at the beginning of the 17th Century. 
 
Philosophy, including the argument from design, had been employed as the handmaid of 
theology before, most famously in St Thomas Aquinas’ proofs for the existence of God. But 
Aquinas created his proofs within an already existing context of faith. In other words they 
had purposes other than that of producing religious conviction12. By the time Lessius and 
Mesenne were writing they felt they needed to combat what they saw as the errors of 
atheism, feared to be growing as a product of the uncertainties created by the 
Reformation13.  Presumably one of the reasons atheists were atheists was because they felt 
their spiritual life gave them no grounds for belief in God. Therefore it must have seemed to 
apologists for religion that if unbelievers were to be convinced it would have to be as the 
result of arguments drawn from the appearance of physical reality. Avoiding an appeal to 
kinds of spiritual experience which atheists claimed did not exist, they turned instead to the 
natural world, over the existence of which there was no dispute. 
 
Buckley does not say so, but one might hazard a guess that there was another motive for 
putting too much weight on spiritual experience. This was alarm at the political chaos 
created by the untutored, often somewhat crazy fideism of the Radical Reformers who 
emerged from a ruptured Christendom. Amongst educated people in 17th Century England 
it generated a distaste for most kinds of religious subjectivity, labelled as ‘Enthusiasm’14. 
John Locke repudiated these manifestations in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
published in 1690, where he stated that it is a fallacious ground of assent to a proposition 
because “it takes away both reason and revelation and substitutes ... the ungrounded 
fancies of a man’s own brain...”  Enthusiasts are those who “cannot be mistaken in what 
they feel ... they are sure because they are sure, and their persuasions are right, only 
because they are strong in them.”15 Similarly Isaac Newton, though deeply and rather 
eccentrically religious himself, felt a revulsion at the outpourings of “all enthusiasts, ranters, 
men who spoke with tongues”.16 
 
In this political context, says Buckley, the most convincing “warrant for the personal god was 
the impersonal world: the strongest evidence for the personal god was the design within 
nature”.17  Accordingly, the task of the defence of religion was given over in particular to the 
natural philosophers, a responsibility willingly accepted by both Isaac Newton and René 
Descartes. It seemed that as the result of a loss of morale, numerous mainstream 
theologians no longer believed they had the means to establish their own cognitive claims. 
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But, says Buckley, this giving up of spiritual experience in the defence of religion eventually 
generated the destruction it was meant to avoid, 
For if religion itself has no inherent ground upon which to base its assertion, it is only a 
question of time until its inner emptiness emerges as positive denial... . Eventually the self 
denial of religion becomes the more radical but consistent denial that is atheism. If religion has 
no intrinsic justification, it cannot be justified from the outside. The very forces mustered 
against atheism will dialectically generate it, just as the northern tribes enlisted to defend 




The evidence so far 
I hope this historical excursus has helped to put Hardy’s achievement into a much larger 
context. His originality it seems to me grows out of a stubborn empiricism which refuses to 
bow down before the social constructions of our European history. Alister would not allow 
his own experience to be denied or reduced and in this respect I believe he was less caught 
up in the presuppositions of post-Enlightenment culture than his reductionist predecessors. 
Paradoxically of course, in breaking free, he utilised the methodology of empirical science 
deriving from the Enlightenment to create a new kind of natural theology. Instead of 
coming at the sacred indirectly by means of natural philosophy or the argument from 
design (as did Newton and Paley), he urged the necessity of looking directly at our religious 
experience. 
 
What do we find when we begin to attempt this task, for it is a task that has only just begun 
in the last thirty years? Hardy’s view so clearly contradicts its major competitors that it is a 
good candidate for what the philosopher of science Karl Popper calls a “daring 
conjecture”.19 From Popper’s perspective, the way that scientific knowledge grows is 
through the proposal of bold hypotheses which are open to refutation by scientific test. At 
the time of this talk, Hardy’s idea stands up well in comparison to other more prominent 
reductionist conjectures: Marx’s “opium of the people” hypothesis; Freud’s assumption 
that “religious experience” is symptomatic of neurosis; and Durkheim’s association of 
spiritual experience with social “effervescence”.20 
 
• Contrary to what could be predicted from Marx’s postulate, at least in Britain, people 
who might be classed as ‘oppressed’ (the inner city poor; the long term unemployed) 
are less likely than others to speak of spirituality. In part this may be due to inarticulacy 
because of an underprivileged education, but it could also be seen as simply a further 
dimension of the psychological damage created by unjust social conditions. 
• There is a statistically significant association between report of experience and good 
mental health and personal happiness.21 This suggests that at the least we need to be 
wary of Freud’s dismissal of religious experience (and hence perhaps spirituality in the 
sense we have been using the term) as symptomatic of neurosis.22 
• Most people say that their spiritual awareness occurs typically when they are alone.23 
This sharply contradicts Durkheim’s ‘social effervescence’ hypothesis, which suggests 
that religious experience ‘is’ the excitement experienced by people involved in large 
and enthusiastic religious gatherings. 
 
In fact, spiritual experience is very widely reported in the adult population of Britain. 
Questions placed in a Gallup Omnibus Survey in Britain in 1986 revealed that about half 
those surveyed felt they had had such experience.24 A series of in-depth studies on 
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particular sub-populations in England,25 where there was time to build up rapport and 
overcome the shyness of those being interviewed, suggests the probability that about two-
thirds of the population are aware of a spiritual dimension to their experience. 
  
In broad terms then, Hardy’s hypothesis has proved resilient under scientific testing. But a 
prudent caution is in order. In coming to consider the ideas of the past masters against 
which Hardy’s conjecture is pitted we are always in danger of ‘conceptual slippage’. Marx, 
Freud and Durkheim were writing about a poorly focused area of study that included both 
‘religion’ and ‘spirituality’, often confused with each other. They were using the intellectual 
framework available to them in their time. It is not clear that they would be intolerant of 




Why spirituality has political and social importance 
These academic arguments have more than a theoretical importance. At the level of 
practical politics the most important single finding of my research over the past twenty 
years is the very strong connection there appears to be between spiritual awareness and 
ethical behaviour. Almost without exception, people link their spiritual or religious 
experience with a moral imperative. I have questioned literally hundreds of people about 
this matter. Typically they say that the initial effect of their experience is to make them look 
beyond themselves. They have an increased desire to care for those closest to them, to take 
issues of social justice more seriously and to be concerned about the total environment. 
Again and again people say things like “I behave better; it touches the conscience”. One 
person said “I now have far more respect for my physical surroundings as well as fellow 
humans ... I don’t think they were important to me before”. 
 
Others associate their moment of spiritual insight with a radical shift in their life’s purpose. 
A woman who gave up a job which was meaningless to her to look after delinquent children 
dated it from half an hour of sitting in the park on a sunny evening, 
... quite suddenly I felt lifted beyond all the turmoil and the conflict. There was no visual image 
and I knew I was sitting on a seat in the park but I felt as if I was lifted above the world and 
looking down on it. The disillusion and cynicism were gone and I felt compassion suffusing my 
whole being ... 
Others find that once they have begun working in a caring role, for example nursing the 
sick, their spiritual awareness becomes much deeper and confirms their choice of 
vocation.27 American studies which parallel my own show similar effects: finding meaning in 
life, becoming concerned for a just society, losing racial prejudice, becoming less 
materialistic. In addition the statistics show that both in Britain and in America people in 
touch with their spirituality appear to be in a better state of mental health than those who 
are not.28 
 
The philosopher Alfred North Whitehead once wrote: “The misconception which has 
haunted philosophical literature throughout the centuries is the notion of independent 
existence. Every entity is only to be understood in terms of the way in which it is interwoven 
with the rest of the universe.” In the accounts of spiritual experience that I have investigated 
there seems to be a direct, almost perceptual recognition of that fact. The person discovers 
that the extreme individualism of modern Western society is an illusion. As a result the 
‘psychological distance’ between oneself and the rest of reality disappears. With older 
people this is usually experienced as a realisation that the love of God pervades everything 
and implies our stewardship of creation. Amongst younger people who are cut off or 
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alienated from the religious institutions, it is increasingly expressed as a mystical insight that 
damage to any part of the fabric of reality is damage to oneself. 
 
 
The Nature of Spirituality 
My most recent research has been on the spirituality of 6-year-old and 10-year-old children, 
and is described in the book I have just published, The Spirit of the Child.29 The main point to 
mention is that we did not come across a child without a spirituality. This suggests to us that 
the disappearance of spirituality from public discourse in adult life is a socially constructed 
phenomenon, closing off the expression of a biologically based predisposition, as indeed 
could be predicted from Hardy’s hypothesis. What is the nature of that predisposition? Last 
year we mounted a computer assisted analysis of over a thousand pages of transcripts of the 
children’s talk to try to uncover the underlying theme running across all expressions of their 
spirituality. The theme that emerged we have labelled relational consciousness. Relational 
consciousness is the intuition of a profound relationship between the child and the whole of 
reality – with other people, with the environment and with God. The isolated, and therefore 
inevitably manipulative individual implied by Descartes’ notion of the res cogitans gives way 
to the recognition that we belong to each other in the most intimate fashion. 
 
The findings that are growing out of research into Hardy’s hypothesis give support to the 
traditional intuition that spirituality underpins ethical behaviour and encourages social 
cohesion. There is however a problem. Although spirituality is much more widespread than 
we once thought, it is also privatised. In a society in which the public face is one of 
alienation from spirituality, it is very often seen as an embarrassment, not to be talked 
about or even admitted to oneself. As a result the initial breadth of a person’s insight often 
dwindles down and becomes constricted to little more than a source of private comfort in 
times of distress. Privatisation dissipates the potential of spirituality to change society 
because it cannot feed easily into public understanding or political legislation. This is a 
major practical loss created by the decline of the religious institutions in the West. Even 
with all their potential for corruption or trivialisation they carry thousands of years of 
reflection on the moral and political implications of spiritual insight. 
 
Somehow we need to learn how not waste this stock of wisdom, whilst at the same time 
taking a broad view of the nature of spirituality, so as to incorporate its insights wherever 
they emerge. The distinction which I have drawn between religion and spirituality is an 
important one. In a public address given half a century ago, Lord Samuel expressed his 
alarm at the consequences of the disappearance of religion: 
All through the ages religion has been the principal source of the moral law and its mainstay, 
an incentive to noble minds, a guide to the peoples. The lives and teachings of the founders of 
Faiths, the prophets and sages, saints and martyrs, have bequeathed to mankind a precious 
heritage, exalted continually by poetry, music and all the arts. Imagine it gone: suppose the 
extreme case – the cathedrals deserted and fallen into ruin, like the mediaeval castles; the 
churches and synagogues, mosques and temples turned to other uses;  their ministers 
dismissed, their zealous laity disbanded; suppose that heritage of centuries all dissipated and 




Paradoxically the Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner digs deeper, below the formal expression of 
religion. .In one of his Theological Investigations he invites his readers to imagine a situation 
in which the kind of destruction imagined by Lord Samuel has taken place. More radically 
still, he suggests the possibility that there could come a time when even the memory of 
religion has gone and the word ‘God’ has disappeared from the dictionary, 
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And even if this term were ever to be forgotten, even then in the decisive moments of our lives 
we should still be constantly encompassed by this nameless mystery of our existence ... even 
supposing that those realities which we call religions . .. were totally to disappear ... the 
transcendentality inherent in human life is such that [we] would still reach out towards that 
mystery which lies outside [our] control.
31
 
This view of Rahner’s points precisely to the significance of distinguishing between 
spirituality and religion. He is expressing from his theological perspective much the same as 
Hardy says from a biological angle. The challenge posed for us by Hardy’s vision, is how to 
reconstruct our Western culture so that it gives proper social and political expression to our 
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